Person- and situation-specific factors in discounting science via scientific impotence excuses

The scientific impotence excuse (SIE; Munro, 2010) predicts that „people resist belief-disconfirming scientific evidence by concluding that the topic of study is not amenable to scientific investigation” (p. 597)”. While the incongruence between scientific claims and individual topic-specific beliefs is indeed a central factor in discounting science, research has, up to now, neglected other factors that might lead to scientific impotence excuses. Therefore, the present work aims at extending SIE theory by investigating factors other than belief-disconfirming evidence that may contribute to the devaluation of science. As a situational factor, it will focus on the contradictoriness of the evidence presented, and, as person-specific factor, it will investigate the incongruence between the (epistemic) nature of the scientific evidence and individual epistemic beliefs (i.e., individual beliefs about knowledge).

Munro (2010) found that individuals, when confronted with belief-disconfirming scientific evidence, resist this information by concluding that the topic at hand is not amenable to scientific investigation – a scientific impotence excuse. We strived to replicate this finding and to extend this work by analyzing other factors that might lead to scientific impotence excuses. As a person-specific factor, we analyzed the role of epistemic beliefs, and as a situational factor, we focused on the contradictoriness of the evidence at hand. Three sets of hypotheses were preregistered. In an experimental 2x3 online study drawing on a general population sample of N = 901 participants, we first assessed our participants’ prior beliefs on the effects of acupuncture versus massaging (pro acupuncture vs. no opinion). One experimental group then read fictitious empirical evidence claiming superiority of acupuncture, another group read evidence speaking against acupuncture, and a third group read conflicting evidence (i.e., a mix of pro- and contra-findings). Scientific impotence excuses were measured by a newly developed questionnaire. Our first hypothesis, which suggested that participants believing in the superiority of acupuncture would make stronger scientific impotence excuses when confronted with belief-disconfirming findings, was confirmed. A second hypothesis suggested that scientific impotence excuses would be stronger when individuals were confronted with evidence exhibiting a ‘nature’ that contradicts their topic-specific epistemic beliefs. This hypothesis was partially supported. A third hypothesis suggested that individuals confronted with conflicting evidence would make stronger scientific impotence excuses, and this was again confirmed. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.

Study protocol here: http://dx.doi.org/10.23668/psycharchives.2662

Study protocol here: http://dx.doi.org/10.23668/psycharchives.2662 Dataset here: http://dx.doi.org/10.23668/psycharchives.2906