Preprint

Misinformation as an Event Model Problem

This article is a preprint and has not been certified by peer review [What does this mean?].

Author(s) / Creator(s)

Huff, Markus
Göbel, Jan Pascal
Fischer, Helen

Abstract / Description

Why does misinformation continue to influence reasoning even after it has been corrected? Dominant accounts treat this persistence as a failure of belief updating, emphasizing propositional acceptance, motivational resistance, or memory decay. We argue that this view overlooks a key constraint on comprehension: misinformation is typically encountered within temporally unfolding narratives and integrated into event-structured mental models. Drawing on event cognition, we propose that misinformation often acquires a causal role within an event representation, supporting prediction, explanation, and inference. Corrections that merely negate false information remove a causal element without restoring model completeness, leaving incoherent representations that invite compensatory inference and the reemergence of misinformation. By contrast, our framework predicts that corrections that align with event boundaries and provide factually accurate, causally adequate replacements should be more likely to stabilize updated representations. This event-model perspective unifies continued influence effects, delayed resurgence of misinformation, and inference-based false memory. It suggests that effective interventions must not only revise beliefs but also restore coherence in narrative event models.

Keyword(s)

event cognition misinformation situation models

Persistent Identifier

Date of first publication

2026-05-05

Publisher

PsychArchives

Citation

  • 2
    2026-05-05
    Revised version with clarified theoretical framing, consistent taxonomy of empirical phenomena, expanded integration with prior literature (event cognition, discourse, knowledge revision), and improved precision of claims and scope.
  • 1
    2026-01-26
  • Author(s) / Creator(s)
    Huff, Markus
  • Author(s) / Creator(s)
    Göbel, Jan Pascal
  • Author(s) / Creator(s)
    Fischer, Helen
  • PsychArchives acquisition timestamp
    2026-05-05T13:17:16Z
  • Made available on
    2026-01-26T08:20:52Z
  • Made available on
    2026-05-05T13:17:16Z
  • Date of first publication
    2026-05-05
  • Abstract / Description
    Why does misinformation continue to influence reasoning even after it has been corrected? Dominant accounts treat this persistence as a failure of belief updating, emphasizing propositional acceptance, motivational resistance, or memory decay. We argue that this view overlooks a key constraint on comprehension: misinformation is typically encountered within temporally unfolding narratives and integrated into event-structured mental models. Drawing on event cognition, we propose that misinformation often acquires a causal role within an event representation, supporting prediction, explanation, and inference. Corrections that merely negate false information remove a causal element without restoring model completeness, leaving incoherent representations that invite compensatory inference and the reemergence of misinformation. By contrast, our framework predicts that corrections that align with event boundaries and provide factually accurate, causally adequate replacements should be more likely to stabilize updated representations. This event-model perspective unifies continued influence effects, delayed resurgence of misinformation, and inference-based false memory. It suggests that effective interventions must not only revise beliefs but also restore coherence in narrative event models.
    en
  • Publication status
    other
  • Review status
    notReviewed
  • Persistent Identifier
    https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12034/16979.2
  • Persistent Identifier
    https://doi.org/10.23668/psycharchives.21904
  • Language of content
    eng
  • Publisher
    PsychArchives
  • Keyword(s)
    event cognition
  • Keyword(s)
    misinformation
  • Keyword(s)
    situation models
  • Dewey Decimal Classification number(s)
    150
  • Title
    Misinformation as an Event Model Problem
    en
  • DRO type
    preprint
  • Leibniz institute name(s) / abbreviation(s)
    IWM