The use of alternative reasons in probabilistic judgment
This article is a preprint and has not been certified by peer review [What does this mean?].
Author(s) / Creator(s)
Baron, Jonathan
Burcu Gürçay-Morris
Abstract / Description
We examine a behavioral measure of actively open-minded thinking (AOT), based on generation of alternative reasons or contradicting evidence. We also developed and tested a short online module to train people in actively open-minded thinking, based on the same idea. In three studies reported here, subjects made probabilistic judgments in three-choice almanac questions. Subjects were overconfident in their probability judgments, but overconfidence was lower (in two studies) in subjects who scored higher on a measure of AOT beliefs, and on trials when the behavioral measure was higher. Study 2 showed that forcing subjects to think of alternative reasons reduced overconfidence. Study 3 tested the effectiveness of new online AOT training modules we designed for adults, in a pre-test/post-test design. The training module, relative to a control condition, increased both the behavioral and belief-based measures of AOT and reduced overconfidence. Otherwise, the behavioral and belief-based AOT measures did not correlate with each other.
Persistent Identifier
Date of first publication
2023-01-09
Publisher
PsychArchives
Citation
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args-2.pdfAdobe PDF - 257.78KBMD5: 1454aab0305661624b189f91f2de220b
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Author(s) / Creator(s)Baron, Jonathan
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Author(s) / Creator(s)Burcu Gürçay-Morris
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PsychArchives acquisition timestamp2023-01-09T08:45:14Z
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Made available on2023-01-09T08:45:14Z
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Date of first publication2023-01-09
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Abstract / DescriptionWe examine a behavioral measure of actively open-minded thinking (AOT), based on generation of alternative reasons or contradicting evidence. We also developed and tested a short online module to train people in actively open-minded thinking, based on the same idea. In three studies reported here, subjects made probabilistic judgments in three-choice almanac questions. Subjects were overconfident in their probability judgments, but overconfidence was lower (in two studies) in subjects who scored higher on a measure of AOT beliefs, and on trials when the behavioral measure was higher. Study 2 showed that forcing subjects to think of alternative reasons reduced overconfidence. Study 3 tested the effectiveness of new online AOT training modules we designed for adults, in a pre-test/post-test design. The training module, relative to a control condition, increased both the behavioral and belief-based measures of AOT and reduced overconfidence. Otherwise, the behavioral and belief-based AOT measures did not correlate with each other.en
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Publication statusotheren
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Review statusnotRevieweden
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Persistent Identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12034/7887
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Persistent Identifierhttps://doi.org/10.23668/psycharchives.12346
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Language of contenteng
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PublisherPsychArchivesen
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Dewey Decimal Classification number(s)150
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TitleThe use of alternative reasons in probabilistic judgmenten
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DRO typepreprinten