Preregistration

No good deed goes unpunished? Investigating punishment of moral rebels

Author(s) / Creator(s)

Fischer, Moritz
Twardawski, Mathias
Gollwitzer, Mario

Abstract / Description

Previous research has demonstrated that people sometimes react negatively towards others who openly express moral concerns about a specific behavior (‘moral rebels’). To date, negative reactions towards moral rebels have mainly been investigated with regard to the perceived likability of a moral rebel. Our research aims at testing whether people not only perceive moral rebels as less likeable but whether or not they also employ own money to punish moral rebels. To address this research question, we designed an experimental paradigm using a two-round ultimatum game with a bogus other player. Participants first play an ultimatum game in which they take the role of the proposer while the bogus other player is the responder. The offer of the participants in this round constitutes our first independent variable. Next, participants play another round of this ultimatum game with switched roles. The bogus other player now offers a fair split and expresses one out of two reasons for this behavior (our experimental manipulation and second independent variable): He/she either expresses that proposing an unequal split would be immoral (moral reasoning condition) or an unequal split would be economically detrimental (economic reasoning condition). As our dependent variable, we measure whether participants engage in costly punishment of the other player. We hypothesized that the more unfairly participants behave in the first ultimatum game, the more severely they punish a fair player with moral reasons in comparison to fair player with economic reasons in the second ultimatum game.

Persistent Identifier

PsychArchives acquisition timestamp

2019-11-20 13:57:21 UTC

Citation

Fischer, M., Twardawski, M., & Gollwitzer, M. (2019, May 27). No good deed goes unpunished? Investigating punishment of moral rebels. Leibniz Institut für Psychologische Information und Dokumentation (ZPID). https://doi.org/10.23668/PSYCHARCHIVES.2651
  • Author(s) / Creator(s)
    Fischer, Moritz
  • Author(s) / Creator(s)
    Twardawski, Mathias
  • Author(s) / Creator(s)
    Gollwitzer, Mario
  • PsychArchives acquisition timestamp
    2019-11-20T13:57:21Z
  • Made available on
    2019-11-20T13:57:21Z
  • Date of first publication
    2019-05-27
  • Abstract / Description
    Previous research has demonstrated that people sometimes react negatively towards others who openly express moral concerns about a specific behavior (‘moral rebels’). To date, negative reactions towards moral rebels have mainly been investigated with regard to the perceived likability of a moral rebel. Our research aims at testing whether people not only perceive moral rebels as less likeable but whether or not they also employ own money to punish moral rebels. To address this research question, we designed an experimental paradigm using a two-round ultimatum game with a bogus other player. Participants first play an ultimatum game in which they take the role of the proposer while the bogus other player is the responder. The offer of the participants in this round constitutes our first independent variable. Next, participants play another round of this ultimatum game with switched roles. The bogus other player now offers a fair split and expresses one out of two reasons for this behavior (our experimental manipulation and second independent variable): He/she either expresses that proposing an unequal split would be immoral (moral reasoning condition) or an unequal split would be economically detrimental (economic reasoning condition). As our dependent variable, we measure whether participants engage in costly punishment of the other player. We hypothesized that the more unfairly participants behave in the first ultimatum game, the more severely they punish a fair player with moral reasons in comparison to fair player with economic reasons in the second ultimatum game.
    en_US
  • Publication status
    other
  • Citation
    Fischer, M., Twardawski, M., & Gollwitzer, M. (2019, May 27). No good deed goes unpunished? Investigating punishment of moral rebels. Leibniz Institut für Psychologische Information und Dokumentation (ZPID). https://doi.org/10.23668/PSYCHARCHIVES.2651
    en
  • Persistent Identifier
    https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12034/2266
  • Persistent Identifier
    https://doi.org/10.23668/psycharchives.2651
  • Language of content
    eng
    en_US
  • Dewey Decimal Classification number(s)
    150
  • Title
    No good deed goes unpunished? Investigating punishment of moral rebels
    en_US
  • DRO type
    preregistration
    en_US